

Esperanza

Indian Ocean Expedition

2013

Summary of findings
18 March - 17 May 2013

October 2013

GREENPEACE

Esperanza Indian Ocean Expedition 2013

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Image: The Greenpeace ship Esperanza was in the Indian Ocean for two months investigating fishing vessels operating illegally or using highly destructive and wasteful fishing techniques.
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Introduction

Together with the Pacific, the Indian Ocean is critical for the supply of tuna to the global market. The two oceans account for over 80% of the world's tuna catches. The failure to manage these fisheries sustainably raises a significant threat to long-term supplies, and to the wider health of the marine environments that support them. Despite their importance, current management of tuna fisheries in the Pacific and Indian Oceans is failing to safeguard these future supplies by allowing poorly understood, weakly regulated and mostly uncontrolled fishing to continue and even expand.

In the Indian Ocean the multi-billion dollar tuna fishery is exploited by numerous distant water fishing powers such as France, Spain, China, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. This pressure is increased by several coastal states such as India, Sri Lanka, Iran and Indonesia, with huge and predominantly unregulated fleets of their own, also targeting tuna. Much of this fishing effort is poorly documented. To this day, there is no clear assessment of the exact number and type of vessels catching tuna, tuna-like, as well as dependent and associated species, in the Indian Ocean, or of the quantities caught and/or discarded.

Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing remains a major problem in the region. Low observer coverage across the fleets, and the ongoing practice of allowing transshipments at sea, means that many weak links remain in the supply chains, through which illegal fish can enter the system. The latest assessment of IUU fishing in the Eastern Indian Ocean, conducted by the Marine Resource Assessment group (MRAG), estimated the total illegal catch of all species in the region to be between 21% and 43% of the total.¹

The inadequate monitoring, control and surveillance of Indian Ocean tuna fisheries must be addressed as a regional priority. The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) – the body with responsibility for managing Indian Ocean tuna fisheries sustainably – is currently failing in its job, and urgently needs to improve its performance by implementing far-reaching reform.

Esperanza in the Indian Ocean

Between 18 March and 17 May 2013, Greenpeace International conducted an expedition in the Indian Ocean to document the activities of tuna fishing fleets. Many coastal and island nations in the region lack the ability to adequately police their own waters, let alone ensure legal practice further out on the high seas. Using the Greenpeace vessel *Esperanza*, we have been able to help compile further evidence of the ways in which Indian Ocean tuna fisheries are poorly controlled (see Case Study #1 on pages 8-9), failing to protect the interest of the many local people who depend on the ocean for their food and living (see Case Study #2 on pages 10-11), and risk allowing IUU tuna into the supply chain through continued use of transshipment at sea (see case study #4 on pages 14-15).

This research expedition builds on our first round of research that was conducted between September and November 2012 on board the *Rainbow Warrior*.²


This year's research tour took place in three main stages, which are outlined below. During the tour, a total of 32 vessels were documented at sea and in port by our research teams. Observations were conducted from the *Esperanza*, inflatable boats where necessary, and from our helicopter for aerial surveillance. The *Esperanza* was staffed by a multinational crew and campaign staff, with professional translators on board to aid communications with fishing vessels in Mandarin, Korean, Japanese, French and Spanish.

Tour Stages

Stage 1: Sri Lanka to Madagascar

Stage 2: Surveillance in the Northern Mozambique Channel

Stage 3: Interception of the vessel *Premier*, surveillance of the transshipment hotspot and return to Madagascar



Case Studies

#1: Sri Lankan longliners inside the Chagos EEZ marine reserve

IUU fishing

On the morning of 24 March 2013 we observed seven Sri Lankan longliners (and one other vessel believed, but not confirmed, to be from the same fleet) inside the Chagos EEZ marine reserve. All of the vessels were observed and recorded by our helicopter surveillance team, who came across the vessels during a routine patrol. A summary of the vessels found and their exact locations is contained in Figure 1 overleaf.

Four of the vessels observed were stationary. Two more were underway and headed towards this group of four. A further two vessels observed underway but apart from each other. All eight vessels were within a relatively close distance from each other (4-6km), and at the time of sighting were all well inside the Chagos EEZ boundary, by around 20 nautical miles. Our helicopter observation team recorded that, upon being sighted, the group of four stationary vessels immediately started their engines and sped off towards the EEZ boundary line. As soon as they were sighted, and when they heard the helicopter, those vessels already underway immediately changed course, and headed in the direction of the EEZ boundary. All of the vessels recorded were at the time on the IOTC Record of Authorised Fishing Vessels.

Because the vessels were observed a very long distance from the *Esperanza* we did not make radio contact with them to request on board inspections using our rigid inflatable boats. This would have taken some hours to execute, and we did not have sufficient time to deviate from our planned route. However, our helicopter surveillance team was able to fly close enough to take detailed photographs of seven of the vessels. These photographs clearly show the presence of longline fishing gear on deck, contained in large barrels. Several of the vessels had empty barrels on deck, indicating that their gear was deployed. This may explain why the vessels were stationary; they could have been waiting to haul.

Image: Four Sri Lankan longliners in the Chagos EEZ.
© Jiri Rezac / Greenpeace.

Vessel	Co-ordinates where found	Time found (UTC+5)	Remarks
IMUL-A-0208-CHW	04°18'02058"S 75°02'89368"E	09.32	Group of four, all stationary
IMUL-A-0607-CHW			
IMUL-A-0500-CHW			
IMUL-A-0419-CHW			
IMUL-A-0212-CHW	04°21'594"S 75°00'239"E	09.43	Underway and headed towards group of four
IMUL-A-0430-CHW			
IMUL-A-0374-KLT	04°50'55612"S 74°22'37940E	10.24	Underway, apart from the other vessels
Unidentified	Unconfirmed, but inside Chagos EEZ; sighted on helicopter transit back to <i>Esperanza</i>	10.29	Underway, apart from the other vessels Believed to be Sri Lankan

The photographs also show that several vessels had shark fins of various sizes and different species of fish drying on their cabin roofs. It was not possible to identify which species the shark fins originated from, but some of the fish and fins appeared to have been fished relatively recently.

The presence of Sri Lankan longliners apparently engaged in fishing activities inside the protected waters of the Chagos EEZ is of particular concern because it comes on top of similar observations made by Greenpeace International in 2012 during our Indian Ocean Expedition with the *Rainbow Warrior*. In October 2012, three Sri Lankan longliners were observed inside the Chagos marine reserve. On-board inspections were undertaken on two of these vessels, revealing that one of them (IMUL-A-0352-KLT) had an ice storage room that mainly contained sharks, with fins attached, as well as a few tuna and a swordfish. Later in the tour, in November 2012, the helicopter surveillance crew launched from the *Rainbow Warrior* observed two more Sri Lankan vessels engaged in illegal fishing activities inside the Maldivian EEZ, where they do not have permission to operate.

On top of this year's findings, a picture is beginning to emerge of widespread illegal operations among this part of the Sri Lankan fishing fleet inside the Chagos marine reserve. Our surveillance of the Sri Lankan fleet from this year's operation has been supplied to the IOTC, to the British Indian and Overseas Territories department inside the UK Government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and to the Sri Lankan authorities. In addition, Greenpeace presented these findings to the plenary of the IOTC 2013, held in Mauritius. Despite overwhelming evidence of repeated infringements by Sri Lankan vessels, the IOTC decided not to take any action against those vessels and their flag state, and merely encouraged Sri Lanka to continue to improve compliance with IOTC rules.³ We continue to pursue this incident of illegal fishing with the relevant authorities, and anticipate further steps by Sri Lanka to ensure these cases are thoroughly investigated. Where sufficient evidence exists, these cases should be prosecuted, and vessels found guilty of illegal activities should be fined, and their licences permanently cancelled.




Image: A Sri Lankan fishing vessel runs at full speed in the Chagos EEZ.
© Jiri Rezac / Greenpeace

Image: Local Malagasi port workers carry damaged tuna in the port of Antsiranana, Madagascar.
© Jiri Rezac / Greenpeace



#2: Purse seine port transhipments in Antsiranana, Madagascar

Unintended impacts on local fishermen and the local fishing economy

During the tour we made two stops in the town and port of Antsiranana in northern Madagascar, once between 3 and 5 April, and a second time between 14 and 17 May. During the first stop, we arrived in port and found two purse seiners already tied up and transhipping into a reefer (refrigerated transport vessel). The two purse seiners were the vessel *Torre Giulia* (flagged to France) and the *Trevignon* (flagged to Mayotte). They were transhipping onto the reefer *Antilla* (flagged to Curaçao). Both seiners appear on the IOTC authorised vessel list, but the reefer does not as IOTC does not require reefers transhipping in port to be listed.

Our research teams watched the transhipment operation. During the process, significant quantities (estimated to be at least 2 tonnes) of damaged and juvenile tuna, and a number of sharks, were discharged on to the quayside, where waiting crew and canning factory workers were able to help themselves. We observed sizeable quantities of fish being taken away by individual crew and factory staff out of the harbour complex, so that the quayside was always completely clear of any fish put there for collection. The presence of sharks in the catch clearly indicates an ongoing problem of bycatch of non-target species, although these vessels use Fish Aggregation Devices (FADs) with bycatch mitigation technologies.

In subsequent interviews, local fishermen and others involved in trading local fish⁴ told our researchers that the practice of giving away free fish in this way had detrimental impacts on the local fishing economy, as it undercuts local prices and makes it very difficult for local coastal small-scale fishermen and traders to sell their fish at a price that provides them with a living. Significant volumes of the fish are given away by the seiners and subsequently purchased by wholesalers, to be sold on the local markets across the region. Our researchers witnessed fish taken from the quayside being sold at the port gates to a small number of individuals who were loading two or three vehicles. The presence of this poor quality and cheap fish on the market drives down prices for locally-caught, better quality fish during the purse seine season. While some fish dumped on the quayside is certainly taken and used for domestic consumption, this practice has a negative impact on local fish prices.

IOTC will implement a ban on discards, starting in 2014. The impact on coastal fishermen and local fishing economies from landing bycatch will increase, unless action is taken urgently to impose more selective fishing gears and practices to reduce bycatch levels and phase out techniques with higher bycatch rates, such as purse seines used with FADs.

Image: Greenpeace activists protest in Port Louis, Mauritius against the *FV Premier*, owned by South Korea's largest tuna company, Dongwon Industries. The South Korean vessel is accused of illegal fishing in African waters.

© Jiri Rezac / Greenpeace

#3: Dongwon's *Premier* in the Indian Ocean

The movements of the South Korean-flagged purse seiner *FV Premier*

This vessel was of particular interest, because it had been involved in illegal tuna fishing operations off the coast of West Africa in late 2011 and early 2012. The story first came to light following reports on the Stop Illegal Fishing (SIF) website in February 2012, exposing the *Premier's* involvement in illegal fishing in Liberian waters. Following an inspection by the Mauritian government at the request of Liberia, several documents were found on board confirming suspicions of illegal fishing in Liberian waters. In January 2013, an employee of Dongwon Industries (the owners of the *Premier*) forwarded two letters to the Government of Kenya, supposedly addressed by the Liberian authorities to the flag state, South Korea, implying that the IUU fishing suspicions were a misunderstanding. The Liberian authorities declared that these letters were forged documents. In response, Dongwon claimed it had been the victim of fraud, a claim later refuted by the Liberian government.

Our observations during late March and early April 2013 showed the *Premier* operating in international waters north of the Seychelles. On 16 April, the *Premier* began moving south, away from the Seychelles towards Port Louis, Mauritius. On 18 April, concerns about the vessel's involvement in IUU fishing, and uncertainty about the legality of the fish on board, moved Greenpeace to alert the Mauritian authorities, the IOTC and tuna processors operating in Port Louis about the potential contamination of the Mauritian supply chain with IUU fish if the *Premier* were to be allowed to unload in Mauritius. The Mauritian government moved swiftly, and stated publicly that it would not allow the *Premier* to unload.


On 19-20 April, the *Premier* arrived in Port Louis and was allowed to berth to receive essential supplies.

The following morning, in order to further highlight the illegal fishing activities and potentially illegal catch on board the *Premier*, Greenpeace activists took peaceful direct action in Port Louis, painting the word "Illegal" in English and Korean on the vessel's hull. Greenpeace congratulated the Mauritian government for taking strong action against IUU fishing in the region and clearly demonstrating that IUU fish is not welcome in the country's supply chain. Although IUU fishing remains widespread in Indian Ocean tuna fisheries, our direct action and the leadership shown by the Mauritian government sent a strong message – that IUU fishing will not be tolerated – to those nations fishing in the region.

The *Premier* has now returned to South Korea, but before doing so was allowed by the Sri Lankan authorities to unload its fish in Colombo. This means that it is very possible that illegally-caught fish entered the Sri Lankan supply chains at this point.

Dongwon has now settled with the Liberian government for the sum of \$2m US dollars.





#4: Transshipment hotspot

Area near Mauritius used frequently by tuna reefers

During the tour, using surveillance facilities from the *Esperanza*, our helicopter, and supported by online vessel monitoring services, our research teams were able to identify an area used frequently by tuna reefers (refrigerated transport vessels) who are involved in the process of transshipping fish, supplies, etc at sea. Transshipping at sea has long been identified as, and continues to be, a weak link in the supply chain, whereby IUU-caught tuna can easily enter the system.

The IOTC Compliance Committee noted at its 10th session on 2-4 May 2013 that a total of 169 possible infractions, with the requirement of IOTC Resolution 12/05 on establishing a programme for transshipment by large-scale fishing vessels, were recorded in 2012 (84 in 2011).

The transshipment hotspot we identified is located in international waters, just outside the very north eastern-most tip of the Mauritian EEZ.

Greenpeace monitored the transshipment hotspot continuously from 18 March to 15 May. Throughout this period our research indicates that there was always at least one reefer inside or close to the hotspot at any one time. The hotspot was visited by the reefers *Tuna Princess*, *Shin Izu* and *Tuna Queen*. Two further vessels believed to be reefers – the *Ryoma* and the *Frio Dolphin* – were also recorded close to, but outside of, the hotspot, at the same latitude.

The *Esperanza* visited the hotspot between 25 and 28 April 2013, and while in the area was able to document first hand three transshipments between the *Tuna Queen* and three different longliners, all of which were on the IOTC Record of Authorised Vessels. The *Tuna Queen* is flagged to Panama, owned by Star Navigation SA based in Panama City, and operated by Mitsubishi Reefer Services (MRS) based in Tokyo, Japan.



Vessel	MMSI	Flag	Registered owner	Dates in/close to hotspot
TUNA PRINCESS	352 894000	Panama	Star Navigation SA	24 March - 4 April
SHIN IZU	576 139000	Vanuatu	Sea Road Line Inc.	21-22 April
TUNA QUEEN	352 894000	Panama	Wang Tat Corporation Private Limited	23 April - end of documentation 29 April
RYOMA	577 105000	Vanuatu	HYTU Line SA	Around 24 March
FRIO DOLPHIN	576 688000	Vanuatu	Athenian Marine Limited	Around 24 March



Transshipment 1: *Tuna Queen* and *Jetmark 101*

On the morning of 25 April, we conducted a helicopter surveillance of the *Tuna Queen*. On arrival at the vessel's location (12°15'1"S 60°05'9"E) at 11.30am, our helicopter team observed and documented a transshipment operation between the reefer *Tuna Queen* and the longliner *Jetmark 101*.

The *Esperanza* arrived at the transshipment location at approximately 15.00pm on the same day, by which time the transshipment of tuna had finished and the *Jetmark 101* was receiving supplies from the *Tuna Queen*. Radio contact was made between the *Esperanza* and the *Tuna Queen*, whose captain told us that he had received around 99 tonnes of tuna from the *Jetmark 101*. He also said that he usually stays in one location for several weeks on end, and receives tuna from several vessels every day, but most commonly from Taiwanese vessels.

A number of features about the transshipment between the *Jetmark 101* and the *Tuna Queen* indicated possible IUU fishing activity. These are discussed in the separate, more detailed Case Study #5.



Transshipment 2: *Tuna Queen* and the *Yi Long 202*

On the morning of 26 April at 06.00am local time, the Taiwanese-flagged fishing vessel *Yi Long 202* approached the *Tuna Queen* (located at 12°19'21"S 60°30'11"E), and began to transfer tuna at around 07.00am. Given our close proximity, we were able to launch inflatable boats and record the transshipment from the water close to the two vessels. The transshipment process lasted around three-and-a-half hours, before the ships disengaged and *Yi Long 202* departed.

The *Yi Long 202* was considerably smaller than the *Jetmark 101*, and there was no reason to suspect that the vessel had transferred anything other than its own fish. The vessel was on the IOTC Record of Authorised vessels.



Transshipment 3: *Tuna Queen* and the *Chin Horng 3*

On the morning of 28 April at around 05.45am local time, another transshipment operation was documented between the *Tuna Queen* (located at 12°17'31"S 60°17'7"E) and the Taiwanese-flagged longliner *Chin Horng 3*. Our research team documented this transshipment both from the helicopter and inflatable boats. The transshipment lasted around 4 hours.

During the transshipment, we made radio contact with the captain of the *Chin Horng 3*, who told us that several Japanese reefers are often present in the area at any one time.

As our team finished recording this transshipment, another Taiwanese longliner appeared in the area ready to tranship. The captain of the *Chin Horng 3* told us that it belonged to the same company as his vessel.



#5: Transhipments from the *Jetmark 101*

A cause for concern

The *Tuna Queen* appears to be one of a number of reefers providing transhipment facilities in the hotspot area discussed in Case Study #5, and is clearly an important part of what appears to be a sizeable at-sea transhipment operation taking place on the high seas to the north east of the Mauritian EEZ. The *Tuna Queen* and the *Jetmark 101* were both on the IOTC Record of Authorised Vessels at the time. However, the *Jetmark 101* did not have a licence to fish or operate in Seychelles waters, even though our monitoring of the vessel indicated that it had spent much of its time in the Indian Ocean on or just to the east of the Seychelles EEZ line. The *Jetmark 101* is flagged to the Philippines, but is owned and operated by a Taiwanese company.⁵

Our team documented 11 wooden containers on the deck of the *Tuna Queen* bearing the names of different fishing vessels, mostly of Taiwanese origin. The boxes seemed likely to contain food, spare parts and other supplies destined for those vessels. Our team noted movements of the crates during the three-day observation, suggesting that crates were brought out of the hold as the fishing vessels took delivery.

During our observations of the transhipment from the *Jetmark 101* to the *Tuna Queen*, we made radio contact with both captains. The captain of the *Jetmark* reported that he was engaged in fishing for tuna, and routinely transhipped to the *Tuna Queen* and other reefers. However, closer examination of the photographic and video evidence shows that there is very little evidence of the *Jetmark 101* currently being used for fishing because:

- The line handling gear had been removed from the vessel, and there were no hook storage barrels visible.
- There were no hydraulic lines to be seen on the deck.
- Areas where we would have expected to see fishing gear in position were replaced with rusty deck plates
- The vessel appeared to be set up for moving crates and gear.

Our observers recorded many more storage crates marked for the *Jetmark 101* on the deck of the *Tuna Queen* than might have been expected for a vessel of its size.

Circumstantial evidence showing the absence of fishing gear on board the *Jetmark 101*, and the many storage crates intended for her on the *Tuna Queen*, suggests that the *Jetmark 101* is quite possibly not fishing, but instead acting as a mini-reefer for other fishing vessels. Such boats act as “laundry” vessels, collecting fish from vessels that may well be fishing illegally. If operating in this way, the *Jetmark 101* would serve to ensure that illegally-caught fish only arrives on the *Tuna Queen* from an apparently legitimate source, since the *Jetmark 101* was at the time on the IOTC Record of Authorised Vessels. Such “laundering” processes are very likely to play a significant role in allowing IUU fish caught in the Indian Ocean to enter the supply chain. While inconclusive in this instance, this case study perfectly illustrates the loophole and inherent weaknesses in the supply chain created by transhipments at sea, where monitoring and control fall far short of the levels needed to restrict IUU activity.



Following our visual observations of the *Tuna Queen* and the *Jetmark 101* on 25 April 2013, further monitoring through electronic systems showed that the *Tuna Queen* followed the route of the *Jetmark 101* south a few days later, and that the vessels came together and were alongside at sea a second time.

The *Jetmark 101* and other vessels owned by the same company, Jetmark International Fishing Inc and Sunwarm Tuna Fishing Corporation (both registered at the same Manila address) have come to the attention of the IOTC and other authorities before, in relation to IUU issues. In March 2012 the *Jetmark 101* was inspected but found to be using an expired licence. A new one was faxed to the vessel before its next transhipment. In addition, the vessel's VMS was found to have an on/off switch. In July 2012, the *Sunwarm 8* produced an expired fishing licence when inspected. When questioned, the captain indicated that a new fishing licence was waiting in Mauritius and he was going to pick it up before the next transhipment.⁶

Transhipments at sea are widely considered to be a major facilitator of IUU fishing activities in tuna fisheries. Greenpeace is calling for an immediate ban on transhipments at sea.

Image:
Transhipment
from the *Jetmark
101* to the *Tuna
Queen*.
© Jiri Rezac /
Greenpeace

Conclusions and Recommendations

Following last year's ship expedition Greenpeace made a series of recommendations. Our findings this year only reinforce the urgent need to deliver on these recommendations.

Ban all transshipments at sea

Our documentation of the "transshipment hotspot" shows that huge volumes of tuna are being caught and transferred on to reefers, much of which is then removed from the region so that the value of the fish is realised outside of the Indian Ocean. This process not only negatively impacts coastal states' economies and development but also seriously undermines regional conservation and management measures. At-sea transshipments allow large quantities of IUU-caught fish to enter the supply chain. The concerns we raise around the vessel *Jetmark* clearly illustrate one way in which illegally caught fish could very easily be "laundered" at sea, to appear as legitimately caught tuna.

There is clear evidence from around the world that one of the simplest ways to deter IUU fishing is to ban all transshipments at sea.⁷ Coastal states and flag states should adopt national legislation by the end of 2013, and table proposals for, and actively support, the adoption of a ban on transshipments at sea at the 2014 session of the IOTC.

Enhance MCS capacity in the region

The groups of Sri Lankan longliners spotted inside the Chagos marine reserve both in 2012 and 2013, the transshipment operations observed on the high seas, including outside of the Mauritian EEZ, and the lack of observer coverage on the longline fleet, among other issues, reinforces the need for significantly more efficient and stricter monitoring, control and surveillance of Indian Ocean tuna fisheries.

In order to ensure better control of and compliance by fishing vessels, coastal and flag States member of the IOTC should urgently:

- implement the "UN FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing"⁸;
- adopt national and regional plans of action to prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing;
- formalise the exchange of information on vessels licensed to fish in EEZs in the region/subregion (licence conditions/validity/movements, activities, history of compliance, etc);
- increase and formalise regional and sub-regional cooperation including;
 - pooling of MCS assets; and
 - training programmes for MCS officers⁹;
- adopt IOTC inspection and report format; and
- require electronic reporting (AIS/VMS) for vessels of 24m or more in length, and for all vessels fishing outside the EEZ of their flag state.



Image: Local Malagasi sailing boat in the port of Antsiranana, Madagascar.
© Jiri Rezac / Greenpeace

Ban shark finning, enforce marine reserves and sanctuaries and ban the use of FADs with purse seines

Last year's tour gathered significant evidence of shark capture and finning by Sri Lankan, Japanese and Taiwanese vessels in the Indian Ocean. Our second expedition confirmed this problem. From the smaller Sri Lankan longliners with shark fins drying on their roof, through to the large European seiners discharging sharks on to the quayside, it is clear that high numbers of sharks are being caught as bycatch and as targeted catch. The presence of the Sri Lankan longliners inside the Chagos marine reserve, easily spotted two years in a row, indicates the routine infringement of this protected area.

- Existing shark protection regulations must be systematically and strictly enforced. This is not currently the case.
- IOTC-protected thresher sharks were observed as bycatch during both ship tours. The protection already afforded these sharks, as well as the conservation measure for oceanic white tip and whale sharks adopted at the 2013 session of the IOTC, must be more rigorously enforced across the region.
- Conservation measures for other vulnerable and endangered sharks, such as hammerhead and silky sharks, as well as a ban on shark finning, must be adopted.
- The Maldives shark sanctuary and the Chagos marine reserve must be better patrolled, in order for the sites to deliver their full potential benefit.
- In the absence of clear scientific evidence that so-called "Eco Fads" significantly reduce overall bycatch levels, the use of FADs with purse seines should be banned. In addition to the continued impacts on juvenile tuna and non-target species, the discard ban coming into force next year risks negatively impacting local fishermen and fishing economies unless bycatch levels are reduced significantly and quickly.

Stop capacity migration and scrap overcapacity

Excess fishing capacity is one of the most urgent issues facing tuna management, globally and in the Indian Ocean. The effects of stock declines in the Atlantic tuna fisheries are being felt in the southern Indian Ocean fisheries, where many fleets – including Spanish longline vessels – have now relocated. The Taiwanese longline fleet has increasingly moved south to fish for albacore, granting some relief to the bigeye stocks but resulting in the overexploitation of the albacore fisheries. Sri Lanka, like many other coastal states in the region, has large domestic fleets that are travelling further and further as stocks closer to shore have declined. For instance, Sri Lanka is estimated to have over 3,000 small wooden vessels that, despite their size, use destructive fishing gears – particularly longlines and gillnets. Unless effective fishing capacity reductions and selective fishing techniques are urgently imposed, these fleets will continue to contribute to overfishing and cause irreparable damage to shark populations and species vulnerable to bycatch in gillnets such as turtles.

As part of the ongoing allocation and capacity reduction discussions within the IOTC, preferential access to these fisheries should be granted to states and fleets best meeting the following criteria:

- Low environmental impacts (level of bycatch, damage to the marine environment, including impact on species composition and the food web, is minimal).
- History of compliance/flag state performance.
- Amount and quality of data provided by flag states and operators.
- Low energy consumption per unit of fish caught.
- Quality of the fish produced and delivered to market.
- Socio-economic benefits such as employment provided, especially to coastal communities.

In addition, an accurate input fishing capacity assessment should be conducted and capacity reduction programmes should be implemented in a way that does not result in capacity migration to other regions or fisheries.

Endnotes

- 1 The Global Extent of Illegal Fishing (2008). Marine Resource Assessment Group and the University of British Columbia.
- 2 Greenpeace International (2013). Rainbow Warrior Indian Ocean Expedition 2012, Summary of Findings 8 September to 11 Nov 2012.
- 3 IOTC (2013). Report of the 10th Session of the Compliance committee IOTC-2013-CoC10-R[E] (7.3 & 7.4)
- 4 Interviews undertaken by Greenpeace research team on location in Antsiranana, Madagascar between 14 and 16 May 2013.
- 5 Taiwan's use of flags of convenience and some of the concerns raised by this issue were covered in the Greenpeace East Asia report *The Inconvenient Truth of Taiwan's Flags of Convenience*, published in September 2010. <http://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/publications/reports/oceans/2011/Taiwan-FOC-report/>
- 6 <http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2013/coc/IOTC-2013-CoC10-08c%20Rev1%5bE%5d.pdf>
- 7 Final report of the Ministerially-led Task Force on IUU Fishing on the High Seas. Closing the Net (2006) <http://www.illegal-fishing.info/info/uploads/HSTFFINALweb.pdf>
- 8 IOTC Resolution 10/11
- 9 See FAO Port State Measures Annex 5 on Guidelines for the training of inspectors.

Appendix: Vessels sighted 24 March-30 April 2013

■ Longliner	■ Reefer
■ Longliner / Reefer	■ Purse seiner

	Time	Vessel	Co-ordinates	Aree	Flag	Call sign	MMSI	IMO No.	Comments
24 March	09.32	IMUL-A-0208-CHW	04°18S 75°02E	Chagos EEZ	Sri Lanka	-	n/a	n/a	Observed by helicopter team inside Chagos EEZ marine reserve, shark fins spotted, on IOTC vessel list
	09.32	IMUL-A-0607-CHW	04°18S 75°02E	Chagos EEZ	Sri Lanka	-	n/a	n/a	Observed by helicopter team inside Chagos EEZ marine reserve, shark fins spotted, on IOTC vessel list
	09.32	IMUL-A-0600-CHW	04°18S 75°02E	Chagos EEZ	Sri Lanka	-	n/a	n/a	Observed by helicopter team inside Chagos EEZ marine reserve, shark fins spotted, on IOTC vessel list
	09.32	IMUL-A-0419-CHW	04°18S 75°02E	Chagos EEZ	Sri Lanka	-	n/a	n/a	Observed by helicopter team inside Chagos EEZ marine reserve, shark fins spotted, on IOTC vessel list
	09.43	IMUL-A-0212-CHW	04°21S 75°00E	Chagos EEZ	Sri Lanka	-	n/a	n/a	Observed by helicopter team inside Chagos EEZ marine reserve, on IOTC vessel list
	09.43	IMUL-A-0430-CHW	04°21S 75°00E	Chagos EEZ	Sri Lanka	-	n/a	n/a	Observed by helicopter team inside Chagos EEZ marine reserve, on IOTC vessel list
	10.24	IMUL-A-0374-KLT	04°50S 74°22E	Chagos EEZ	Sri Lanka	-	n/a	n/a	Observed by helicopter team inside Chagos EEZ marine reserve, on IOTC vessel list
	10.28	Unconfirmed	-	Chagos EEZ	Believed Sri Lanka	-	n/a	n/a	Observed by helicopter team inside Chagos EEZ marine reserve but from same distance. Appeared to be same size and type as the rest of the group
26 March	23.55	<i>Guan Wang</i>	09°47S 68°51E	High Seas	Taiwan	DJ4702	n/a	n/a	Radioed at night, confirmed targeting yellowfin and bigeye tuna, on IOTC vessel list
29-30 March	21.15	<i>Tuna Princess</i>	12°16S 60°36E	High Seas	Vanuatu	YJQT4	576139000	9314612	Data=AIS, then visual of lights at night as vessel passed <i>Esperanza</i> . Intermittent drifting then steaming in this area for some days, no transshipment observed
2-4 April	-	<i>Torre Giulia</i>	12°16S 49°17E	Antsiranana Port	France	FLSI	226312000	9151084	Observed in port, transshipping into the reefer <i>Antilla</i> , bycatch of damaged tuna and sharks offloaded to quayside. Greenpeace inspection requested but refused.
	-	<i>Antilla</i>	12°16S 49°17E	Antsiranana Port	Curaçao	PJJI	306511000	8812801	Observed in port receiving tuna from purse seiners <i>Torre Giulia</i> and <i>Trevignon</i>
	-	<i>Trevignon</i>	12°16S 49°17E	Antsiranana Port	Mayotte	FMJQ	660001900	9359698	Observed in port, transshipping onto the reefer <i>Antilla</i> , bycatch of damaged tuna and sharks offloaded to quayside. Greenpeace inspection requested but refused.
4 April	13.30	<i>Erroxape</i>	11°51S 49°18E	Madagascar EEZ	Seychelles	S70W	n/a	7413816	Visual sighting, vessel cruising towards Antsiranana port
	13.49	<i>Franche Terre</i>	11°46S 49°39E	Madagascar EEZ	Mayotte	FNSN	n/a	9540156	Visual sighting, headed towards La Reunion, on IOTC register
5 April	08.01	<i>Albacan</i>	11°20S 46°59E	Glorioso Is. EEZ	Spain	EACO	224 469000	8906468	Visual sighting, cruising at 10-14kn, appeared to be looking for fish. Agreed to an inspection but then outpaced us
6 April	06.21	<i>Demiku</i>	13°04S 46°38E	Mayotte EEZ	Seychelles	S70V	n/a	7365227	Sighted inside Mayotte EEZ cruising at 18kn. Inspection requested but refused.
7 April	18.33	<i>Fukeseki Maru 7</i>	14°00S 47°10E	Madagascar EEZ	Japan	JEKB	431 838000	9141223	Visual sighting, found drifting, on IOTC list. On-board inspection request refused by captain.
8 April	07.32	<i>Playa De Arizatzu</i>	14°03S 45°13E	Madagascar EEZ	Spain	EBVR	224 922000	9228162	Visual sighting
21 April	-	<i>Premier</i>	-	Port Louis Harbour, Mauritius	South Korea	DTBY3	441 734000	8919489	Vessel identified in port. Greenpeace action delivered on vessel, because of previous IUU activity in African waters
24 April	10.31	<i>Tuna Princess</i>	12°08S 61°14E	High Seas	Vanuatu	YJQT4	576 139000	9314612	Visual sighting, vessel found cruising at between 10 and 14kn
25 April	11.30	<i>Tuna Queen</i>	12°08S 61°14E	High Seas	Panama	HPFK	352 894000	9278612	Visual sighting, transshipping with Jetmark 101, just outside of Mauritius EEZ. Inspection requested but refused
	07.02	<i>Win Far No 828</i>	12°17S 60°17E	Mauritius EEZ	Taiwan	BI2574	n/a	9219537	Visual sighting, heading towards Mauritius, cited engine trouble
	11.32	<i>Jetmark 101</i>	12°15S 60°05E	High Seas	Philippines	DUSA4	548 055100	n/a	Visual sighting, transshipping onto the <i>Tuna Queen</i> , transshipment photographed and videoed. Inspection requested but refused
26 April	08.15	<i>Yi Long 202</i>	12°19S 60°30E	High Seas	Taiwan	B12520	n/a	n/a	Visual sighting, transshipping onto the <i>Tuna Queen</i> , transshipment photographed and videoed. On-board inspection conducted
27 April	12.01	<i>Le Bigouden</i>	10°55S 60°16E	High Seas	France	FMKZ	n/a	n/a	Visual sighting, fishing just outside of Mauritius EEZ
	14.15	<i>Chuan Fa Shian 88</i>	12°29S 61°07E	High Seas	Taiwan	BJ4910	n/a	n/a	Visual sighting, fishing inside transshipment hotspot
	14.15	<i>Shui Ho Cheng</i>	12°29S 61°07E	High Seas	Taiwan	BJ4685	n/a	n/a	Visual sighting, fishing inside transshipment hotspot very close to <i>Chuan Fa Shian 88</i> . Radio contact made
28 April	5.45	<i>Chin Horng 3</i>	12°17S 60°17E	High Seas	Taiwan	BJ12316	n/a	n/a	Visual sighting, observed transshipping onto the <i>Tuna Queen</i> , transshipment photographed and videoed
	8.15	<i>Chin Hung Yun</i>	12°17S 60°17E	High Seas	Taiwan	BJ12317	n/a	n/a	Visual sighting, vessel joined queue waiting for transshipment onto the <i>Tuna Queen</i> . Radio contact confirmed same owner as <i>Chin Horng 3</i>
30 April	15.30	<i>Jordan 5</i>	18°27S 58°13E	Mauritius EEZ	Taiwan	BJ5038	n/a	n/a	Observed by helicopter team fishing inside Mauritius EEZ, photographed, radio contact made



image: French purse seiners transship tuna to the reefer vessel *Antilla* in the port of Antsiranana, Madagascar.
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